1. Explain the court of appeals’ reasoning that Section 1985(2) did not provide a remedy for Haddle.
2. What is the flaw in the court of appeals’ reasoning that Section 1985(2) did not provide a remedy for Haddle?
3. State the rule of the law.

[Michael A. Haddle, an at-will employee, alleges that the defendants conspired to have him fired from his job in retaliation for obeying a federal grand jury subpoena and to deter him from testifying at a federal criminal trial. According to Haddle's complaint, a federal grand jury indictment in March 1995 charged Healthmaster, Inc., and defendants Jeanette Garrison and Dennis Kelly, officers of Healthmaster, with Medicare fraud. Haddle cooperated with the federal agents in the investigation that preceded the indictment. He also appeared to testify before the grand jury pursuant to a subpoena but did not testify because of the press of time. He was also expected to appear as a witness in the criminal trial resulting from the indictment. Although Garrison and Kelly were barred by the Bankruptcy Court from participating in the affairs of Healthmaster, Haddle contended that they conspired with G. Peter Molloy, Jr., one of the remaining officers of Healthmaster, to bring about Haddle's termination. They did this both to intimidate him and to retaliate against him for his attendance at the federal court proceedings. Haddle contends that their acts had "injured [him] in his person or property" in violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1985(2). In dismissing the suit for failure to state a claim, the district court relied on circuit precedent holding that an atwill employee discharged pursuant to a conspiracy proscribed by Section 1985(2) has suffered no actual injury because he has no constitutionally protected interest in continued employment. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed.]
REHNQUIST, C. J.…
The Eleventh Circuit held that an at-will employee who is dismissed pursuant to a conspiracy proscribed by § 1985(2) has no cause of action. The Morast
court explained that "to make out a cause of action under § 1985(2) the plaintiff must have suffered an actual injury. Because Morast was an at will employee, … he had no constitutionally protected interest in continued employment. Therefore, Morast's discharge did not constitute an actual injury under this statute." Id., at 930. Relying on its decision in Morast, the Court of Appeals affirmed. Judgt. order reported at 132 F. 3d 46 (1997)….

Section 1985(2), in relevant part, proscribes conspiracies to "deter, by force, intimidation, or threat, any party or witness in any court of the United States from attending such court, or from testifying to any matter pending therein, freely, fully, and truthfully, or to injure such party or witness in his person or property on account of his having so attended or testified." The statute provides that if one or more persons engaged in such a conspiracy "do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or property, … the party so injured … may have an action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury … against any one or more of the conspirators." § 1985(3)….

Our review in this case is accordingly confined to one question: Can petitioner state a claim for damages by alleging that a conspiracy proscribed by
§ 1985(2) induced his employer to terminate his atwill employment?

We disagree with the Eleventh Circuit's conclusion that petitioner must suffer an injury to a "constitutionally protected property interest" to state a claim for damages under § 1985(2). Nothing in the language or purpose of the proscriptions in the first clause of § 1985(2), nor in its attendant remedial provisions, establishes such a requirement. The gist of the wrong at which § 1985(2) is directed is not deprivation of property, but intimidation or retaliation against witnesses in federal-court proceedings. The terms "injured in his person or property" define the harm that the victim may suffer as a result of the conspiracy to intimidate or retaliate. Thus, the fact that employment at will is not "property" for purposes of the Due Process Clause, see Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 345-347 (1976), does not mean that loss of at-will employment may not "injur[e] [petitioner] in his person or property"
for purposes of § 1985(2).
We find that the sort of harm alleged by petitioner here-essentially third-party interference with at-will employment relationships-states a claim for relief under § 1985(2). Such harm has long been a compensable injury under tort law, and we see no reason to ignore this tradition in this case. As Thomas Cooley recognized:
"One who maliciously and without justifiable cause, induces an employer to discharge an employee, by means of false statements, threats or putting in fear, or perhaps by means of malevolent advice and persuasion, is liable in an action of tort to the employee for the damages thereby sustained. And it makes no difference whether the employment was for a fixed term not yet expired or is terminable at the will of the employer." 2 T. Cooley, Law of Torts 589-91 (3d ed. 1906) (emphasis added).