1. How did the Supreme Court rule in this case?
2. What policy argument exists for granting federal employees, who are under investigation by their agency, the right to have active union representation not only when the investigator is acting directly for the management of the government agency, but also when the investigator is from the agency’s Office of Inspector General?

[In January 1993, in response to information supplied by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA's) Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted an investigation of certain threatening activities of an employee of the George C. Marshall Space Flight center in Huntsville, Alabama, which is also a component of NASA. A NASA-OIG investigator contacted the employee to arrange for an interview and, in response to the employee's request, agreed that both the employee's lawyer and union representative could attend. The conduct of the interview gave rise to a complaint by the union representative that the investigator had improperly limited the union representative's participation. The union filed a charge with the Federal Labor Relations Authority (Authority), alleging that NASA and its OIG had committed an unfair labor practice. The administrative law judge (ALJ) ruled for the union with respect to its complaint against NASA-OIG. The ALJ concluded that the OIG investigator was a "representative" of NASA within the meaning of Section 7114(a)(2)(B) and that certain aspects of the investigator's behavior had violated the right to union representation under that section. On review, the Authority agreed that the NASA-OIG investigator prevented the union representative from actively participating in the examination.
The Eleventh Circuit granted the Authority's application for enforcement of its order. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.]
STEVENS, J.…
… The question presented by this case is whether an investigator employed in NASA's Office of Inspector General (NASA-OIG) can be considered a "representative" of NASA when examining a NASA employee, such that the right to union representation in the FSLMRS may be invoked….

On October 12, 1978, Congress enacted the Inspector General Act (IGA), 5 U.S.C. App. § 1 et seq., p. 1381, which created an Office of Inspector General (OIG) in each of several federal agencies, including the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). The following day, Congress enacted the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (FSLMRS), 5 U.S.C. § 7101 et seq., which provides certain protections, including union representation, to a variety of federal employees….
The FSLMRS provides, in relevant part,
"(2) An exclusive representative of an appropriate unit in an agency shall be given the opportunity to be represented at-
"(B) any examination of an employee in the unit by a representative of the agency in connection with an investigation if-
"(i) the employee reasonably believes that the examination may result in disciplinary action against the employee; and
"(ii) the employee requests representation." 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a)….
Employing ordinary tools of statutory construction, in combination with the Authority's position on the matter, we have no difficulty concluding that
§ 7114(a) (2) (B) is not limited to agency investigators representing an "entity" that collectively bargains with the employee's union….

… The right Congress created in § 7114 (a) (2) (B) vindicates obvious countervailing federal policies. It provides a procedural safeguard for employees who are under investigation by their agency, and the mere existence of the right can only strengthen the morale of the federal workforce. The interest in fair treatment for employees under investigation is equally strong whether they are being questioned by employees in NASA's OIG or by other representatives of the agency. And, as we indicated in Weingarten, representation is not the equivalent of obstruction. See 420 U.S., at 262-264. In many cases the participation of a union representative will facilitate the fact-finding process and a fair resolution of an agency investigation-or at least Congress must have thought so.

Whenever a procedural protection plays a meaningful role in an investigation, it may impose some burden on the investigators or agency managers in pursuing their mission. We must presume, however, that Congress took account of the policy concerns on both sides of the balance when it decided to enact the IGA and, on the heels of that statute, § 7114(a)(2)(B) of the FSLMRS.
[Affirmed.]
JUSTICE THOMAS, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE, JUSTICE O'CONNOR, and JUSTICE SCALIA join, Dissenting …
In light of the independence guaranteed Inspectors General by the Inspector General Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. App. § 1 et seq., p. 1381, investigators employed in the Office of Inspector General (OIG) will not represent agency management in the typical case. There is no basis for concluding, as the Federal Labor Relations Authority did, that in this case the investigator from OIG for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration was a "representative of the agency" within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 7114(a) (2) (B). I respectfully dissent….