1. What are the traditional remedies available to victims of employment discrimination under Section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?
2. Did Congress in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 expand the remedies available to plaintiffs? Explain.
3. What are the two types of front pay? Is front pay an element of compensatory damages subject to the cap for sex and religious discrimination?

[Sharon Pollard sued her former employer, E. I. duPont de Nemours and Company (duPont), alleging that she had been subjected to a hostile work environment based on her sex, in violation of Title VII. After a trial, the district court found that Pollard was subjected to coworker sexual harassment of which her supervisors were aware. The district court further found that the harassment resulted in a medical leave of absence from her job for psychological assistance and her eventual dismissal for refusing to return to the same hostile work environment. The court awarded Pollard $107,364 in back pay and benefits, $252,997 in attorney fees, and $300,000 in compensatory damages-the maximum permitted under the statutory cap for such damages in 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3). The court observed that the award was insufficient to compensate Pollard, but that it was bound by an earlier Sixth Circuit holding that front pay-money awarded for lost compensation during the period between judgment and reinstatement or in lieu of reinstatement-was subject to the damages cap of § 1981a(b)(3). The Sixth Circuit affirmed.]
THOMAS, J….
Congress … made clear through the plain language of the statute that the remedies newly authorized under § 1981a were in addition to the relief authorized by § 706(g). Section 1981a(a)(1) provides that, in intentional discrimination cases brought under Title VII, "the complaining party may recover compensatory and punitive damages as allowed in subsection (b) of [§ 1981a], in addition to any relief authorized by section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, from the respondent." (Emphasis added.) And § 1981a(b) (2) states that "[c]ompensatory damages awarded under [§ 1981a] shall not include backpay, interest on backpay, or any other type of relief authorized under section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." (Emphasis added.) According to these statutory provisions, if front pay was a type of relief authorized under § 706(g), it is excluded from the meaning of compensatory damages under § 1981a.

[T]he original language of § 706(g) authorizing backpay awards was modeled after the same language in the NLRA. This provision in the NLRA had been construed to allow awards of backpay up to the date of reinstatement, even if reinstatement occurred after judgment. Accordingly, backpay awards made for the period between the date of judgment and the date of reinstatement, which today are called front pay awards under Title VII, were authorized under § 706(g).

As to front pay awards that are made in lieu of reinstatement, we construe § 706(g) as authorizing these awards as well. We see no logical difference between front pay awards made when there eventually is reinstatement and those made when there is not. Moreover, to distinguish between the two cases would lead to the strange result that employees could receive front pay when reinstatement eventually is available but not when reinstatement is not an option-whether because of continuing hostility between the plaintiff and the employer or its workers, or because of psychological injuries that the discrimination has caused the plaintiff. Thus, the most egregious offenders could be subject to the least sanctions. Had Congress drawn such a line in the statute and foreclosed front pay awards in lieu of reinstatement, we certainly would honor that line. But, as written, the text of the statute does not lend itself to such a distinction, and we will not create one. The statute authorizes courts to "order such affirmative action as may be appropriate." 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(g)(1). We conclude that front pay awards in lieu of reinstatement fit within this statutory term.
Because front pay is a remedy authorized under § 706(g), Congress did not limit the availability of such awards in § 1981a. Instead, Congress sought to expand the available remedies by permitting the recovery of compensatory and punitive damages in addition to previous available remedies, such as front pay.
* * * The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.