1. What does the Bennett Amendment provide?
2. What did the employer argue was the purpose of the Bennett Amendment?
3. State the Supreme Court’s decision.
4. If the equal work standard were to apply, could situations exist in which a discriminatorily underpaid woman would be unable to obtain a remedy?

[The plaintiffs were four women employed as matrons at the Washington County, Oregon, jail. The county also employed male corrections officers and deputy sheriffs. The matrons under Oregon law guarded female inmates, while the corrections officers and deputy sheriffs guarded male inmates. Effective February 1, 1973, the matrons were paid monthly salaries of between $525 and $668, while the salaries for the male guards ranged from $701 to $904. The plaintiffs filed suit under Title VII, alleging that they were paid unequal wages for work substantially equal to that performed by their male counterparts and, in the alternative, that part of the pay differential was attributable to intentional sex discrimination. The district court found that the male corrections officers supervised up to 10 times as many prisoners per guard as did the matrons and that the females devoted much of their time to less valuable clerical duties, such as processing fingerprint cards and mug shots, filing reports, keeping medical records, recording deputy sheriffs' activities, and censoring mail. The district court held that the plaintiffs' jobs were not substantially equal to those of the male guards, and the plaintiffs were thus not entitled to equal pay. The district court also dismissed the claimbased on intentional sex discrimination, holding as a matter of law that sex-based wage discrimination cannot be brought under Title VII unless it would satisfy the "equal work" standard of the Equal Pay Act. The court of appeals reversed the district court on this point, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.]
BRENNAN, J.…
The question presented is whether § 703(h) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, restricts Title VII's prohibition of sex-based wage discrimination to claims of equal pay for equal work.
I.
We emphasize at the outset the narrowness of the question before us in this case. Respondents' claim is not based on the controversial concept of "comparable worth," under which plaintiffs might claim increased compensation on the basis of a comparison of the intrinsic worth or difficulty of their job with that of other jobs in the same organization or community. Rather, respondents seek to prove, by direct evidence, that their wages were depressed because of intentional sex discrimination, consisting of setting the wage scale for female guards, but not for male guards, at a level lower than its own survey of outside markets and the worth of the jobs warranted. The narrow question in this case is whether such a claim is precluded by the last sentence of § 703(h) of Title VII, called the "Bennett Amendment."…
II.
Petitioner argues that the purpose of the Bennett Amendment was to restrict Title VII sex-based wage discrimination claims to those that could also be brought under the Equal Pay Act, and thus that claims not arising from "equal work" are percluded. Respondents, in contrast, argue that the Bennett Amendment was designed merely to incorporate the four affirmative defenses of the Equal Pay Act into Title VII for sex-based wage discrimination claims. Respondents thus contend that claims for sex-based wage discrimination can be brought under Title VII even though no member of the opposite sex holds an equal but higher-paying job, provided that the challenged wage rate is not based on seniority, merit, quantity or quality of production, or "any other factor other than sex." The Court of Appeals found respondents' interpretation the "more persuasive." 623 F.2d at 1311, 20 FEP Cases, at 797. While recognizing that the language and legislative hisory of the provision are not unambiguous, we conclude that the Court of Appeals was correct.
The legislative background of the Bennett Amendment is fully consistent with this interpretation….
"Mr. BENNETT. Mr. President, after many years of yearning by members of the fair sex in this country, and after very careful study by the appropriate committees of Congress, last year Congress passed the so-called Equal Pay Act, which became effective only yesterday.
"By this time, programs have been established for the effective administration of this act.

Now, when the civil rights bill is under consideration, in which the word 'sex' has been inserted in many places, I do not believe sufficient attention may have been paid to possible conflicts between the wholesale insertion of the word 'sex' in the bill and in the Equal Pay Act.
"The purpose of my amendment is to provide that in the event of conflicts, the provisions of the Equal Pay Act shall not be nullified.
"I understand that the leadership in charge of the bill have agreed to the amendment as a proper technical correction of the bill. If they will confirm that understand [sic], I shall ask that the amendment be voted on without asking for yeas and nays.
"Mr. HUMPHREY. The amendment of the Senator from Utah is helpful. I believe it is needed. I thank him for his thoughtfulness. The amendment is fully acceptable.
"Mr. DIRKSEN. Mr. President, I yield myself 1 minute.
"We were aware of the conflict that might develop, because the Equal Pay Act was an amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act. The Fair Labor Standards Act carries out certain exceptions.
"All that the pending amendment does is recognize those exceptions, that are carried in the basic act.
"Therefore, this amendment is necessary, in the interest of clarification." 110 Cong. Rec. 13647 (1964).