1. Why was Mayson fired from his job?
2. Does Section 702 allow a religious organization to refuse to hire or to continue in employment individuals who are not members of the religious organization where the positions involved are nonreligious jobs?
3. Why did Congress enact Section 702?

[Mayson worked for 16 years as a building engineer at the Mormon Church's Deseret Gymnasium in Salt Lake City. He was discharged from this job because he failed to qualify for a "temple recommend," which is issued only to individuals observing the church's standards, such as regular church attendance; tithing; and abstinence from coffee, alcohol, and tobacco. A class action suit was brought on behalf of Mayson, Amos, and others claiming that Section 702 was in violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment when construed to allow religious employers to discriminate on religious grounds in hiring and granting tenure for nonreligious jobs. The district court held that Section 702 was unconstitutional as applied to secular activities, and it reinstated Mayson with back pay.]
WHITE, J….
This Court has long recognized that the government may (and sometimes must) accommodate religious practices and that it may do so without violating the Establishment Clause. It is well established, too, that "[t]he limits of permissible state accommodation to religion are by no means co-extensive with the noninterference mandated by the Free Exercise Clause." There is ample room under the Establishment Clause for "benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without interference." At some point, accommodation may devolve into "an unlawful fostering of religion," but this is not such a case, in our view….
After a detailed examination of the legislative history of the 1972 amendment, the District Court concluded that Congress' purpose was to minimize governmental "interfer[ence] with the decision-making process in religions." We agree with the District Court that this purpose does not violate the Establishment Clause….
Appellees argue that § 702 offends equal protection principles by giving less protection to the employees of religious employers than to the employees of secular employers…. To dispose of appellees' Equal Protection argument, it suffices to hold-as we now do-that as applied to the nonprofit activities of religious employers, § 702 is rationally related to the legitimate purpose of alleviating significant governmental interference with the ability of religious organizations to define and carry out their religious missions.
It cannot be seriously contended that § 702 impermissibly entangles church and state; the statute effectuates a more complete separation of the two and avoids the kind of intrusive inquiry into religious belief that the District Court engaged in in this case….
The judgment of the District Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.