In this appeal, we must determine whether appellants, the parents of two young children, have legally cognizable claims for mental anguish allegedly sustained when a repossession agent towed their vehicle out of sight before he realized their children were inside. The parents filed suit against the financing company, the repossession company it hired, and the repossession agent who towed the vehicle. They asserted claims for mental anguish and its physical manifestations under (a) [UCC] section 9.609 * * *

   Ford Motor Credit Corp. (‘‘FMCC’’) hired Traciers & Associates (‘‘Traciers’’) to repossess a white 2002 Ford Expedition owned by Marissa Chapa, who was in default on the associated promissory note. Traciers assigned the job to its field manager, Paul Chambers, and gave him an address where the vehicle could be found. FMCC, Traciers, and Chambers were unaware that the address was that of Marissa’s brother, Carlos Chapa. Coincidentally, Carlos and his wife Maria Chapa also had purchased a white Ford Expedition financed by FMCC. Their vehicle, however, was a 2003 model, and the Chapas were not in default.

   On the night of February 6, 2003, Chambers went to the address and observed a white Ford Expedition. The license number of the vehicle did not match that of the vehicle he was told to repossess, and he did not see the vehicle’s vehicle identification number (‘‘VIN’’), which was obscured. Chambers returned early the next morning and still could not see the Expedition’s VIN. He returned to his own vehicle, which was parked two houses away.

   Unseen by Chambers, Maria Chapa left the house and helped her two sons, ages ten and six, into the Expedition for the trip to school. Her mother-in-law’s vehicle was parked behind her, so Maria backed her mother-in-law’s vehicle into the street, then backed her Expedition out of the driveway and parked on the street. She left the keys to her truck in the ignition with the motor running while she parked her mother-in-law’s car back in the driveway and reentered the house to return her mother-in-law’s keys.

   After Chambers saw Maria park the Expedition on the street and return to the house, it took him only thirty seconds to back his tow truck to the Expedition, hook it to his truck, and drive away. Chambers did not leave his own vehicle to perform this operation, and it is undisputed that he did not know the Chapa children were inside. When Maria emerged from the house, the Expedition, with her children, was gone. Maria began screaming, telephoned 911, and called her husband at work to tell him the children were gone.

   Meanwhile, on an adjacent street, Chambers noticed that the Expedition’s wheels were turning, indicating to him that the vehicle’s engine was running. He stopped the tow truck and heard a sound from the Expedition. Looking inside, he discovered the two Chapa children. After he persuaded one of the boys to unlock the vehicle, Chambers drove the Expedition back to the Chapas’ house. He returned the keys to Maria, who was outside her house, crying. By the time emergency personnel and Carlos Chapa arrived, the children were back home and Chambers had left the scene.

   Maria testified that the incident caused her to have an anxiety attack, including chest pain and numbness in her arm. She states she has continued to experience panic attacks and has been diagnosed with an anxiety disorder. In addition, both Carlos and Maria have been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder.

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   The Chapas first argue that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment against them on their claim that appellees are liable under [UCC] section 9.609. This statute provides in pertinent part:

(a) After default, a secured party:
    (1) may take possession of the collateral;
(b) A secured party may proceed under Subsection (a): * * *
    (2) without judicial process, if it proceeds without breach of the peace. [Citation.]

   The Chapas correctly point out that this statute imposes a duty on secured creditors to take precautions for public safety when repossessing property. [Citation.] Thus, the creditor who elects to pursue nonjudical repossession assumes the risk that a breach of the peace might occur. [Citation.] A secured creditor ‘‘remains liable for breaches of the peace committed by its independent contractor.’’ [Citation.] Thus, a creditor cannot escape liability by hiring an independent contractor to repossess secured property.

   The Chapas assert that FMCC and Traciers, who employed Chambers as a repossession agent, are liable for any physical or mental injuries sustained by Carlos and Maria as a result of Chambers’s breach of the peace. But this argument presupposes that a breach of peace occurred. * * * 

***

   Most frequently, the expression ‘‘breach of the peace’’ as used in the Uniform Commercial Code ‘‘connotes conduct that incites or is likely to incite immediate public turbulence, or that leads to or is likely to lead to an immediate loss of public order and tranquility.’’ [Citations.] (‘‘[S]ecured creditor, in exercising privilege to enter upon premises of another to repossess collateral, may not perpetrate ‘[a]ny act or action manifesting force or violence, or naturally calculated to provide a breach of peace’) [[Citations.] (‘‘[A]lthough actual violence is not required to find ‘breach of the peace,’ within meaning of self-help repossession statute, disturbance or violence must be reasonably likely, and not merely a remote possibility.’’); [Citation.] (no breach of peace when vehicle repossessed from public street while debtor inside house). In addition, ‘‘[b]reach of the peace … refers to conduct at or near and/or incident to seizure of property.’’ [Citations.] (‘‘[E]ven in attempted repossession of a chattel off a street, parking lot or unenclosed space, if repossession is verbally or otherwise contested at actual time of and in immediate vicinity of attempted repossession by defaulting party or other person in control of chattel, secured party must desist and pursue his remedy in court.’’)

   Here, there is no evidence that Chambers proceeded with the attempted repossession over an objection communicated to him at, near, or incident to the seizure of the property. To the contrary, Chambers immediately ‘‘desisted’’ repossession efforts and peaceably returned the vehicle and the children when he learned of their presence. Moreover, Chambers actively avoided confrontation. By removing an apparently unoccupied vehicle from a public street when the driver was not present, he reduced the likelihood of violence or other public disturbance.

   In sum, the Chapas have not identified and we have not found any case in which the repossession of a vehicle from a public street, without objection or confrontation, has been held to constitute a breach of the peace. [Citation.] (deputy sheriff did not breach the peace when he repossessed debtor’s truck because, even if he violated traffic regulation when he drove away, he did so before debtor had an opportunity to confront him); [Citation.] (no breach of the peace occurred when repossession from parking lot was not verbally or otherwise contested). We therefore conclude that Chambers’s conduct did not violate a duty imposed by [UCC] section 9.609.

***

   We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.