Jerry A. Berardi (hereinafter referred to as ‘‘Mr. Berardi’’), Betty J. Berardi, and Bentley Corporation, plaintiffs below appellants (hereinafter collectively referred to as ‘‘the Berardis’’), seek reversal of a summary judgment granted to Meadowbrook Mall Company, an Ohio Limited Partnership, and the Cafaro Company (hereinafter referred to as ‘‘Cafaro Company’’), an Ohio Corporation, defendants below/ appellees (hereinafter collectively referred to as ‘‘Meadowbrook’’ or * * * ‘‘Cafaro Company’’). * * *

                    I
Facts and Procedural History

Between 1985 and 1987, the Berardis leased space for three restaurants from Meadowbrook. In 1990, the Berardis were delinquent in their rent. Cafaro Company, an affiliate of Meadowbrook, sent a letter dated October 1, 1990, to Mr. Berardi citing the arrearages. The letter informed him that a lawsuit would be filed in Ohio requesting judgment for the total amount of the arrearages. The letter proposed that after filing the suits, a consent judgment would be forwarded to Mr. Berardi granting judgment for the full amount of arrearages. Once the consent judgment was signed by both parties and filed with the court, the letter pledged, no steps to enforce the judgment would be undertaken providing the Berardis continued to operate their three restaurants consistent with the then present payment arrangement. Mr. Berardi signed the letter on October 5, 1990. In April 1996, Meadowbrook caused to be filed in the Circuit Court of Harrison County, West Virginia, [the] * * * judgment of the Ohio lawsuits. * * * [Meadowbrook received a] lien on the Goff Building [which was owned by the Berardis, and which] impeded the refinancing [of the building by the Berardis].

   Correspondence was exchanged between counsel for the parties. * * * The correspondence ultimately led, in June 1997, to the Berardis and Anthony Cafaro (an authorized agent for Meadowbrook) signing a ‘‘Settlement Agreement and Release’’ settling the 1990 Ohio judgments. In this document, the Berardis acknowledged the validity of the 1990 Ohio judgments and that the aggregate due under them, plus interest and leasehold charges, was $814,375.97. The Berardis agreed to pay Meadowbrook $150,000 on the date the Goff Building refinancing occurred, and also to pay Meadowbrook $100,000 plus 8.5% interest per year on the third anniversary of the initial $150,000 payment. These payments would discharge the Berardis from all other amounts due and owing. The payment of the initial $150,000 would also result in Meadowbrook releasing the lien against the Goff Building.

The agreement additionally recited:

Berardis hereby release and forever discharge Meadowbrook, its employees, agents, successors, and assigns from any and all claims, demands, damages, actions, and causes of action of any kind or nature that have arisen or may arise as a result of the leases, or Guaranties whether said claims are known or unknown, contingent, or liquidated, from the beginning of time to the effective date of the agreement. Berardis acknowledge there was no unethical behavior on behalf of Meadowbrook Mall Company, its employees, agents.

   Nevertheless, on October 2, 2000, the Berardis filed a complaint against Meadowbrook alleging that Meadowbrook breached the October 1990 agreement by attempting to enforce the 1990 Ohio judgments, that Meadowbrook extorted by duress and coercion the 1997 agreement, and that Meadowbrook and other business entities had conspired to enter into extortionate agreements with their tenants. Meadowbrook filed a motion to dismiss under the 1997 settlement. * * * Meadowbrook sought summary judgment, which the circuit court granted. From this summary judgment, Berardi now appeals.

    * * *
      III
Discussion

   The Berardis contend that because the 1997 agreement was coerced by economic duress, the circuit erred in finding it was enforceable. * * *

   Meadowbrook retorts that the 1997 settlement agreement is valid and was not the result of economic duress in a legal sense. It contends the release was an arms-length transaction between sophisticated business people represented by counsel which is indisputably valid.

    * * *

   ‘‘We begin our discussion of this issue by reiterating, at the outset, that settlements are highly regarded and scrupulously enforced, so long as they are legally sound.’’ [Citation.] ‘‘The law favors and encourages the resolution of controversies by contracts of compromise and settlement rather than by litigation; and it is the policy of the law to uphold and enforce such contracts if they are fairly made and are not in contravention of some law or public policy.’’ [Citations.] Those who seek to avoid a settlement ‘‘face a heavy burden’’ [citation] and ‘‘since * * * settlement agreements, when properly executed, are legal and binding, this Court will not set aside such agreements on allegations of duress * * * absent clear and convincing proof of such claims.’’ [Citation.]

   The Berardis contend the 1997 settlement is invalid as it was procured by ‘‘economic duress:’’

The concept of ‘‘economic or business duress’’ may be generally stated as follows: Where the plaintiff is forced into a transaction as a result of unlawful threats or wrongful, oppressive, or unconscionable conduct on the part of the defendant which leaves the plaintiff no reasonable alternative but to acquiesce, the plaintiff may void the transaction and recover any economic loss.
[Citation.] In [citation], we emphasized that
[t]here appears to be general acknowledgment that duress is not shown because one party to the contract has driven a hard bargain or that market or other conditions now make the contract more difficult to perform by one of the parties or that financial circumstances may have caused one party to make concessions.

   ‘‘Duress is not readily accepted as an excuse’’ to avoid a contract. [Citation.] Thus, to establish economic duress, ‘‘in addition to their own * * * statements, the plaintiffs must produce objective evidence of their duress. The defense of economic duress does not turn only upon the subjective state of mind of the plaintiffs, but it must be reasonable in light of the objective facts presented.’’ [Citation.]

   Mr. Berardi is a sophisticated businessman who has operated a number of commercial enterprises. As of 1997, the Berardis had substantial assets and a considerable net worth. While economic duress may reach large business entities as well as the ‘‘proverbial little old lady in tennis shoes,’’ [citation], when the parties are sophisticated business entities, releases should be voided only in ‘‘‘extreme and extraordinary cases.’’’ [Citation.] Indeed, ‘‘where an experienced businessman takes sufficient time, seeks the advice of counsel and understands the content of what he is signing he cannot claim the execution of the release was a product of duress.’’ [Citation.] While the presence of counsel will not per se defeat a claim of economic duress, ‘‘a court must determine if the attorneys had an opportunity for meaningful input under the circumstances.’’ [Citation.]

   Here, the Berardis were represented by Attorneys John Farmer and Louis E. Enderle, Jr. in negotiations leading up to the June 1997 agreement. These negotiations apparently commenced at least as of April 22 and culminated in the June 1997 agreement. It also appears Mr. Berardi communicated with Attorney Enderle during negotiations. * * * Mr. Enderle stated in his deposition that he was unaware of any reason why the 1997 settlement agreement was unenforceable. The Berardis testified in their depositions they understood they would be bound by the terms of the agreement. * * *

   Further, Mr. Berardi testified at his deposition that he never became aware of any new facts relative to the 1997 agreement that prompted him to sue Meadowbrook. The Berardis stated in their answers to Meadowbrook’s requests for admission that there were no new facts which came to light after the 1997 agreement.

‘‘No case can be found, we apprehend, where a party who, without force or intimidation and with full knowledge of all the facts of the case, accepts on account of an unlitigated and controverted demand a sum less than what he claims and believes to be due him, and agrees to accept that sum in full satisfaction, has been permitted to avoid his act on the ground that this is duress.’’

Citations.]
   Moreover, the Berardis did not file their complaint until October 2, 2000. A party seeking to repudiate a release must act promptly in disavowing it once the putative duress ends or else the party will be deemed to have ratified the agreement. [Citations.] * * *

   Finally, we do not believe that any relative economic inequality between the Berardis and Meadowbrook sufficiently factor into the summary judgment calculation.We have recognized that, ‘‘in most commercial transactions it may be assumed that there is some inequality of bargaining power. * * * ’’ [Citation.] Indeed, even when one sophisticated business entity enjoys ‘‘a decided economic advantage’’ over another such entity, economic duress is extremely circumscribed:

   ‘‘Because an element of economic duress is * * * present when many contracts are formed or releases given, the ability of a party to disown his obligations under a contract or release on that basis is reserved for extreme and extraordinary cases. Otherwise, the stronger party to a contract or release would routinely be at risk of having its rights under the contract or release challenged long after the instrument became effective.’’

[Citation.]
   Given the facts, the law’s disfavor of economic duress, its approbation of settlements, the sophisticated nature of the parties, and the extremely high evidentiary burden the Berardis must overcome, we harbor no substantial doubt nor do we believe the circuit court abused its discretion.

    * * *
      IV
Conclusion

The judgment of the Circuit Court of Harrison County is affirmed.