1.4. We mentioned that the tragedy of the commons is a form of prisoner's dilemma, something we saw back in Chapter 15. As is so often the case in economics, the same model can apply to many different settings. Let's recycle Facts and Tools question Sb from Chapter 16 just to emphasize the point:

Player B Left Up Player A Down

(1 00, 1 00)

(50, 600)

Right

(600, 50)

(500, 500)

a. We have given you very generic trategies:

up, down, left, and right. Relabel the matrix so the game applies to fishermen and the tragedy of the commons.

b. Which set of strategies would give the fishermen the highest joint payoff?

c. Which set of actions would be equivalent to the following choice: "One fisherman decided not to conserve and to catch more than his fair share." (There are two correct answers here.)

d. Which set of actions is the one and only Nash equilibrium? How would you describe it in terms of these two fishermen?