Answered step by step
Verified Expert Solution
Link Copied!

Question

1 Approved Answer

01 Question (2 points) See page 557 Player 1 and player 2 are playing a simultaneous-move one-shot game, where player 1 can perform action 1

image text in transcribed

image text in transcribed

01 Question (2 points) See page 557 Player 1 and player 2 are playing a simultaneous-move one-shot game, where player 1 can perform action 1 or action 2 and player 2 can perform action A or action B. The payoff that each player gets depends on what both players choose. If player 1 moves action 1 while player 2 moves action A, player 1 receives a payoff of 8, and player 2 receives a payoff of 8. If player 1 chooses action 1 and player 2 chooses action B, player 1 receives a payoff of 9, while player 2 receives a payoff of 7. If player 1 instead chooses action 2 and player 2 chooses action A, then player 1 receives a payoff of 7, and player 2 receives a payoff of 9. Finally, if player 1 chooses action 2 and player 2 chooses action B, then player 1 receives a payoff of 10, and player 2 receives a payoff of 10. Use this information to answer the questions below. Note that it may help to summarize the above information in a payoff matrix before tackling the questions. 2nd attempt Part 1 (1 point) See Hint Use the line tool to plot the best response curves for each player. Note that you will need to piece together a few lines to make each best response curve. Then, using the point tool, mark the intersections of the best response curves. Let prepresent the probability that player 1 chooses to play action 1, and let (1-P) represent the probability that player 1 chooses to play action 2. Let q represent the probability that player 2 chooses to play action A, and let (1 q) be the probability that player 2 chooses to play action B. To refer to the graphing tutorial for this question type, please click here. Best Response Curves g 1.6 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.2 1 0.9 0.B 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 D 2 Part 2 (1 point) See Hint Based on the best response curves plotted above, what can you say about the Nash equilibrium (or Nash equilibria) in this game? Choose one: O A. A pure strategy Nash equilibrium does not exist in this game, nor is there a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. O B. There are two pure strategy Nash equilibria in this game, with one mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. C. There is only one pure strategy Nash equilibrium in this game, with no mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. O D. There are two pure strategy Nash equilibria in this game, with no mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. O E. A pure strategy Nash equilibrium does not exist in this game, but there is one mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. O F. There is only one pure strategy Nash equilibrium in this game and one mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. 01 Question (2 points) See page 557 Player 1 and player 2 are playing a simultaneous-move one-shot game, where player 1 can perform action 1 or action 2 and player 2 can perform action A or action B. The payoff that each player gets depends on what both players choose. If player 1 moves action 1 while player 2 moves action A, player 1 receives a payoff of 8, and player 2 receives a payoff of 8. If player 1 chooses action 1 and player 2 chooses action B, player 1 receives a payoff of 9, while player 2 receives a payoff of 7. If player 1 instead chooses action 2 and player 2 chooses action A, then player 1 receives a payoff of 7, and player 2 receives a payoff of 9. Finally, if player 1 chooses action 2 and player 2 chooses action B, then player 1 receives a payoff of 10, and player 2 receives a payoff of 10. Use this information to answer the questions below. Note that it may help to summarize the above information in a payoff matrix before tackling the questions. 2nd attempt Part 1 (1 point) See Hint Use the line tool to plot the best response curves for each player. Note that you will need to piece together a few lines to make each best response curve. Then, using the point tool, mark the intersections of the best response curves. Let prepresent the probability that player 1 chooses to play action 1, and let (1-P) represent the probability that player 1 chooses to play action 2. Let q represent the probability that player 2 chooses to play action A, and let (1 q) be the probability that player 2 chooses to play action B. To refer to the graphing tutorial for this question type, please click here. Best Response Curves g 1.6 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.2 1 0.9 0.B 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 D 2 Part 2 (1 point) See Hint Based on the best response curves plotted above, what can you say about the Nash equilibrium (or Nash equilibria) in this game? Choose one: O A. A pure strategy Nash equilibrium does not exist in this game, nor is there a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. O B. There are two pure strategy Nash equilibria in this game, with one mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. C. There is only one pure strategy Nash equilibrium in this game, with no mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. O D. There are two pure strategy Nash equilibria in this game, with no mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. O E. A pure strategy Nash equilibrium does not exist in this game, but there is one mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. O F. There is only one pure strategy Nash equilibrium in this game and one mixed strategy Nash equilibrium

Step by Step Solution

There are 3 Steps involved in it

Step: 1

blur-text-image

Get Instant Access to Expert-Tailored Solutions

See step-by-step solutions with expert insights and AI powered tools for academic success

Step: 2

blur-text-image

Step: 3

blur-text-image

Ace Your Homework with AI

Get the answers you need in no time with our AI-driven, step-by-step assistance

Get Started

Recommended Textbook for

Handbook Of The Economics Of Finance

Authors: George M. Constantinides, Milton Harris, Rene M. Stulz

1st Edition

044459406X, 978-0444594068

More Books

Students also viewed these Finance questions

Question

Does the stage gate model of project management work?

Answered: 1 week ago