07c (3 points) Suppose that X > 2000. Find all of the Nash eoulllbrla oi this game. leaving X as a variable. + Drag and drop an image or PDF file or click to browse... 07d (4 points] The politician gets to decide what X actually ls. Assuming that she cares only about Increasing her campaign donations, what X should she choose? How does this depend on the equilibrium of the game? To eam credit, you must explain your answer. + Drag and drop an image or PDF file or click to browse... Q7a (2 points) Dolph runs the Acme Golf Company, which makes and sells golf balls. Currently his company is the only one making golf balls, and as a result it is making a tidy profit of $12000 a year, which is great news for Dolph. However, Dolph has received word that in the next period, his arch-enemy Rolph is opening a golf ball company as well, which he knows will cut his profit in half! Even worse, there is a rumor that someone named Molph is thinking of getting into the golf ball business, meaning he would have to split his profit three ways. Now, Dolph knows a politician who could impose zoning restrictions that would prevent other golf ball firms from opening, ensuring that he gets to continue his monopoly, in exchange for an $X "donation" to her campaign fund. If either Dolph or Rolph chooses to make this $X "donation", then they will be the only two golf ball making firms, but if neither makes the "donation", then they will have to split that profit three ways. However, they have to decide independently, or else they will get accused of collusion, so each must make their decision without knowing what the other has decided. Represent this situation as a normal-form game. + Drag and drop an image or PDF file or click to browse... Q7b (3 points) Suppose that X