1. [12 points] Consider the following game with two players. As usual, the first component is Row's payoff. Column Player H M L A (3,0) (5, 1) (2, 2) B (1,2) (2, 2) (3,4) (2,5) (0, 2) (1, 1) Row Player (a) Find all the pure strategy Nash equilibria, if there is any. (b) Find a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium different from any of your answers in (a). Justify your answer. Row's mixed strategy is [H] + [M] + [L] Column's mixed strategy is [A] + [B] + [C] Hint: First determine which pure strategies will not be used (i.e. assigned probability zero) in the equilibrium. (c) What are the expected payoffs of the equilibrium you found in (b)? Row's Exp. Payoff = Column's Exp. Payoff= 1. [12 points] Consider the following game with two players. As usual, the first component is Row's payoff. Column Player H M L A (3,0) (5, 1) (2, 2) B (1,2) (2, 2) (3,4) (2,5) (0, 2) (1, 1) Row Player (a) Find all the pure strategy Nash equilibria, if there is any. (b) Find a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium different from any of your answers in (a). Justify your answer. Row's mixed strategy is [H] + [M] + [L] Column's mixed strategy is [A] + [B] + [C] Hint: First determine which pure strategies will not be used (i.e. assigned probability zero) in the equilibrium. (c) What are the expected payoffs of the equilibrium you found in (b)? Row's Exp. Payoff = Column's Exp. Payoff=