1. A parent can discipline (D) or not (N); a child can be good (G) or bad (B). The parent gets pain from B (-2) and D (-1) but nothing otherwise, the child feels enjoyment (+1) from B and pain (-2) from D but nothing otherwise. The payoff table below represents the situation. Use circles or highlighting of payoffs to show the best responses. Child Good Bad -1 -2 -3 - 1 Parent Discipline Not Discipline 0,0 -2 1 A. What is the Nash Equilibrium (NE) pair of strategies of this game? B. The parent could make a strategic move (threat) by saying, "If you behave badly, I will discipline you." Attach payoffs to the "Bad" branch for the child (taken from the table above) in the game tree below to capture this threat. The first payoff in the pair should be for the Parent (first mover). Use the payoffs for the NE from the table above for the "No Threat" branch. Highlight (in some way) the branch that each player would select. No Threat Good Parent 0,0 Child Threat Bad C. What promise is implicit (not explicitly stated, but understood by all) in the threat from the parent in the text of part B? D. (True or False) The threat in part B would require a deadline. 1. A parent can discipline (D) or not (N); a child can be good (G) or bad (B). The parent gets pain from B (-2) and D (-1) but nothing otherwise, the child feels enjoyment (+1) from B and pain (-2) from D but nothing otherwise. The payoff table below represents the situation. Use circles or highlighting of payoffs to show the best responses. Child Good Bad -1 -2 -3 - 1 Parent Discipline Not Discipline 0,0 -2 1 A. What is the Nash Equilibrium (NE) pair of strategies of this game? B. The parent could make a strategic move (threat) by saying, "If you behave badly, I will discipline you." Attach payoffs to the "Bad" branch for the child (taken from the table above) in the game tree below to capture this threat. The first payoff in the pair should be for the Parent (first mover). Use the payoffs for the NE from the table above for the "No Threat" branch. Highlight (in some way) the branch that each player would select. No Threat Good Parent 0,0 Child Threat Bad C. What promise is implicit (not explicitly stated, but understood by all) in the threat from the parent in the text of part B? D. (True or False) The threat in part B would require a deadline