1. Consider the diagram. MC = 30 and FC =0 A. If the monopolist uses nonlinear pricing in which P = 70 for the first 20 and P = 50 for the next 20 (a) Quantity Discrimination 90 units, PS = 1,400. P., $ per unit A = $200 70 B. Under perfect price C= discrimination, R = 3,600. $200 50 B = C. Under uniform monopoly pricing $1.200 D $200 30 - m R = 1,800. Demand D. Band C. 0 20 40 90 Q. Units per dayThe firm charges 70 per unit for the first 20 units, 50 per unit for the next 20 units, and 30 per unit for any additional units demanded. MC = 30 and FC =0 (a) Quantity Discrimination a) Consumer surplus = 600. 90 P.. $ per unit b) This outcome from this non- A = $200 70 linear price discrimination system C = $200 is efficient. 50 B = $1.200 : D = c) The profit from uniform :$200 30 monopoly pricing = 900. Demand d) All of the above. 0 20 40 90 Q, Units per day3. Assume MC = 0 Main Course Dessert Type A Consumers 30 5 Type B Consumers 25 10 Type C Consumers 20 15 A. If (pure) bundling is used, the revenue-maximizing price is $35 for the bundle. B. Under stand-alone pricing, revenue is maximized when P(main course) =$20 and P(dessert) =10. C. Pure bundling generates more revenue than stand-alone pricing. D. All of the above. The diagram applies to two-part pricing by a monopoly firm with identical consumers. D is demand of one of the consumers. FC =0 and MC = 10. A. The profit-maximizing 80 per unit usage fee > 10. Access Fee, A* B. The firm earns profits = price 2,400 per consumer. D C. The firm's market power leads to DWL. P MC = 10 D. None of the above. quantity 70Find mixed bundling price for hotel? Flight Hotel Bundle Albert 425 175 600 Lisa 450 75 525 Jenny 200 400 600 A. P(Hotel) 2 $400. B. P(Hotel) 2 $75. C. P(Hotel) 2 $175. D. P(Hotel) 2 $150