1. Consider the following three-player game-frame (where ol, 02,...,018 are the possible Q1.1 1(a) 1 Point outcomes): For each player write a utility function that represents her ranking, using consecutive integers with 0 being the lowest. Use these utility functions to obtain a game based on the above game-frame. Player 2 In this game, what are the payoffs associated with the strategy profile (B, D, H)? D E F (what are the payoffs to each player when player 1 plays B, player 2 plays D, and player 3 plays H?) 01 02 03 (8, 4, 2) O (8, 0, 0) Player 1 04 05 O (4 , 5, 1 ) 07 08 09 O (7, 0, 5) Player 3: G Save Answer Player 2 Q1.2 1(b) 1 Point D E F For each player find all the strategies that are strictly dominated. Select all correct statements from 010 011 012 the list below. Player 1 13 014 015 O For Player 2, D is strictly dominated by E 016 017 018 For Player 3, G is strictly dominated by H Player 3: H ONone of the strategies are strictly dominated for any player The players rank the outcomes as follows: O For Player 2, F is strictly dominated by E 07, 016 best For Player 1, A is strictly dominated by B 04, 014 O For Player 1, B is strictly dominated by C 015 013 best 01, 012 05, 014 Save Answer 09 Player 1: Player 2: 01, 07,011 Q1.3 1(c) 05, 013 06, 012 1 Point 02 02, 08, 017 What do you get by applying the iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies? (Which strategy profiles remain after applying the iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies?) 01 1, 018 03, 04, 09, 010,015,016, 018 worst O { (B, E, H) 06 Of(B, D,H), (B,E, H), (C,D,H), (C,E,H)} O {(B,D,G), (B,E,G), (C,D,G), (C,E,G), (B,D,H), (B,E,H), (C,D,H), (C,E,H)} 03, 08, 010,017 worst Save Answer 012 best 15 Q1.4 1(d) 03, 06, 016 1 Point Player 3: ol1 Are there any Nash equilibria? O (B, E, G) is the only Nash equilibrium 02, 07, 014, 017 O (C, D, H) and (C, E, H) are both Nash equilibria 08, 010, 013, 018 O (B, E, G) and (B, D, G) are both Nash equilibria O There are no Nash equilibria 01, 04, 05, 09 worst Save