1 . Consider three bidders who have private values that are independently and uniformly distributed between 0 and 100. Suppose that these values happen to be '01 = 25, v2 = 30, and M3 = 10. Then the equilibrium price in the second-price auction is (A) 25; (B) 30; (C) 10; (D) 20. . (continued) The equilibrium price in the rst-price auction is (A) 25; (B) 30; (C) 10; (D) 20. . (continued) The equilibrium price in the English auction is (A) 25; (B) 30; (C) 10; (D) 20. (continued) The equilibrium price in the Dutch auction is (A) 25; (B) 30; (C) 10; (D) 20. . The game theory outcomes in all of these auctions are (A) Pareto efcient; (B) produced by dominant strategies; (C) the same regardless of the distribution of private values; (D) exhibit Winner's curse. . In experiments, the theoretical prediction for the equilibrium price is most likely to hold for (A) the Dutch auction; (B) the English auction; (C) the second-price auction; (D) the first-price auction. Winner's curse is more severe (A) for common rather than private values; (B) empirical observations rather than theoretical models; (C) for ve rather than three bidders; (D) all of the above. . In experiments, Winner's Curse is most likely to hold for (A) the English auction with private values; (B) the Dutch auction with private values; (C) the second-price auction with private values; (D) the rst-price auction with common values