1). Determine player 2's on-path beliefs for the belief probabilities or and [3 as appropriate. You can infer these beliefs from what we know about beliefs in pooling equilibria, and do not have to fully calculate them. c. Check whether either player wants to deviate. Is there a pooling equilibrium? i. If player 1 is type A or type B and plays up, player 2 will always decide to play left. Starting in the top left corner, (20, 5) is a solution because neither player will want to deviate since their utility value is higher than 0 if they were to deviate. Similarly, (10, -10) is not a solution because player 2 will want to deviate right since 0 > -10. Therefore, there is one pooling equilibrium in this game and it is when player 1 is type LA and plays up, while player 2 plays left