(1) Draw the game matrix of this game.

(2) Is there a weakly strictly dominant strategy equilibrium of this game? If so, write down all of weakly strictly dominant strategy equilibria in this game. If no, write down the reason why no weakly dominant strategy equilibrium exists.

(3) If the answer of the question (2) is no, then apply the iterated elimina- tion of weakly dominated strategies and describe the procedure to reduce the game matrix from the original one. Moreover, specify the set of undominated strategies.

Consider a two-player game (N; X; SA, SB; (UA, UB)), where N = {A, B} is the set of players, SA = {SA, S'A, S'A}, SB = {SB, SB, SB, SB) are the sets of strategies of players respectively, and uA : SA X SB - R is the payoff function of the player A, which is given by UA (SA, SB) = 4; UA (SA, SB) = 3; UA (SA, SB) = 1; UA (SA, SB) = 7; UA (SA, SB) = 3; UA SA, SB) = 2; UA (SA, SB) = 0; UA (SA, SB = 5; UA (SA, SB = 4; UA (SA, SB) = 4; UA (SA, SB) = 0; UA (SA, SB) = 5, while uB : SAX SB - R is the payoff function of the player B, which is given by UB (SA, SB) = 2; UB SA, SB) = 3; UB (SA, SB) = 2; UB (SA, SB) = 2; UB SA, SB = 8; UB (SA, SB) = 4; UB (SA, SB) = 2; UB (SA, SB) = 5; UB (SA, SB) = 1; UB (SA, SB) = 2; UB (SA, SB) = 1; UB (SA, SB) = 0. (1) Draw the game matrix of this game. (2) Is there a weakly strictly dominant strategy equilibrium of this game? If so, write down all of weakly strictly dominant strategy equilibria in this game. If no, write down the reason why no weakly dominant strategy equilibrium exists. (3) If the answer of the question (2) is no, then apply the iterated elimina tion of weakly dominated strategies and describe the procedure to reduce the game matrix from the original one. Moreover, specify the set of undominated strategies