1. Imagine a three player game with persons X, Y and Z. Only Player X & Y make decisions. Monetary payoffs are described by the payoff matric below. Player Y's Choices Action A Action B X: 6 X: 5 Action Y: 6 Y: 5 Player A X's Z: 1 Z: 5 Choices X: 5 X: 5 Action Y: 5 Y: 5 B Z: 5 Z: 5What if instead person X and person Y have ERC inequality aversion preferences with parameters of inequality aversion 6, 6,. We need to fill our table with the new levels of utility from these new preferences. Which of the following represents the utility for Player X if [X plays A, Y plays A]? O U, =60x(6/13 1/3)? O U, =50x(5/15 1/3)? OU,=5