1) Jim is a salesperson at the DM paper company. The utility function of Jim is given by u(w, b, e) = w + b c(e) where w E R is Jim's weekly wage, b is a bonus payment that is conditional on sales revenue, and c(e) is Jim's cost of effort where c(e) = 1 if e < 10 and cle) = (x (e - 10)3) if e > 10. Michael is Jim's boss, who is maximising DM's profits which are given by: TT(w, b, e) = R(e) w b, where R(e) is the firm's sales revenues and R(e) = 100e Michael cannot observe Jim's effort (e) directly but observes R(e) and can set the bonus level dependent on sales revenues. a. If Michael sets w=100 and b=0, what would be Jim's effort level (e) and DM's profits? (1 mark) b. If Michael sets w=0 and b=1000 conditional on reaching a sales target of R(e) = 5000, what would be Jim's effort level (e) and DM's profits? (1 mark) c. If Michael sets w=100 and a bonus payment of 20% of sales revenues (i.e. b = 0.2 R(e)) what would be Jim's effort level (e) and DM's profits? (1 mark) d. What is the optimal wage (w) and bonus payment (b) as a percentage of sales revenues that maximises DM's profits? (1 mark) i. Briefly discuss the potential challenges with implementing such an employment contract in a real-world setting. (1 mark)