1. Suppose the demand for pizza in a small isolated town is p = 10 - Q. There are only two rms, A and B. Each has a cost function TC = 2 + Q. Determine how much each will produce if they agree to form a cartel and split the market. How much prot will each make if they keep to the cartel agreement? Determine the equilibrium quantities of each if they compete as Cournot oligopolists. What is the market price under the Cournot oligopoly? How much prot does each Cournot oligopolist make? Graph their best response functions to depict your answer to part a) Determine the equilibrium quantities of each if rm A is the Stackelberg leader and B is the follower. Suppose rms A and B are Cournot oligopolists. If the government wants to subsidize rm A to raise its (Cournot equilibrium) output to that of a Stackelberg leader, how large should the subsidy be? i. What would the competitive quantity and price be? P\" cinema-99's\