1.) Suppose the market demand for pizza in a small town is p = 21 - Q and that there are only two firms, A and B, who supply pizza in the town, each with a total cost function of C = 2 + q. Solve for the Cournot Equilibrium. List each firms: 1) equilibrium output, 2) best response function, 3) profit, and 4) the overall resulting market price and total quantity produced. (Hint, you can use the properties of symmetry of these identical firms to simplify this process. Also, leave any fractional/decimal prices or quantities as fractions/decimals, do not round)

2.) Taking the Exact same situation above, solve for the Stackelberg Equilibrium if we assume firm A is the leader and firm B moves second. Be sure to provide all the same information that was asked for in the previous problem.

3.) Take the same example from problem #9, but now assume the game is repeated indefinitely and that the two firms are able to successfully collude with one another. Also assume that under their agreement, each firm produces 12 the total market output each period. Solve for the equilibrium and report: 1) the output level of each firm and the total market output, 2) the resulting market price and, 3) the profit level for each firm. Next, compare this outcome (in terms of output for firms, market price, and profit levels for firms) to that of the Cournot Equilibrium. (2 Hints!! First, remember that successful collusion just means the firms will act as a monopoly. Second, you already have most of the conditions for the Cournot equilibrium from problem 9)