1. The following game shown in extensive form below is played by two players, Player 1 and Player 2. Player 1's actions are taken from the set {a, b} in the first node and {e, f} in a subsequent node. Player 2's actions in the first information set are from the set {c, d} and in the second information set, they are from the set {i, j}. Payoff values are given at the terminal nodes where the first member of each pair is the payoff received by Player 1 and the second member is the payoff received by Player 2. (a) Describe the set of pure strategies available to each Player. (b) Represent the above game in strategic (normal) form. (c) Find all Nash Equilibrium Points (NEPs) in pure strategies. (d) By considering all subgames of the above game, indicate (with full explanation) which of these NEPs, if any, are subgame perfect. (e) Find, if they exist the pure strategy Pareto optimal solutions; the pure strategy Stackelberg solution if Player 1 is the Leader and Player 2 the follower