1. The following game shown in extensive form below is played by two players= Player 1 and Player 2. Player 1's actions are taken from the set far, 3:} in the rst node and {3, j? in a subsequent node. Player 2's actions in the rst information set are from the set {(3, d} and in the second information set. they are from the set {I} y}. Payoff values are given at the terminal nodes where the rst member of each pair is the payoff received by Player 1 and the second member is the payoff received by Player 2. (a) Describe the set of pure strategies available to each Player. . a] (0'?) (IL-5!} 134\"] (b) Represent the above game in strategic (normal) form. (c) Find all Nash Equilibrium Points [NEPs) in pure strategies. (d) By considering all subgaines of the above game. indicate (with full explanation) which of these NEPs. if any= are subgame perfect. (e) Find= if they exist I the pure strategy Pareto optimal solutions; I the pure strategy Stackelberg solution if Player 1 is the Leader and Player 2 the follower