10:19 AM Thu Mar 28 & moodle.concordia.ca 2. Take the same industry outlined in question 1 and imagine that firms choose prices rather than quantities. Consumers split themselves evenly across the firms if the firms set the same prices, otherwise all consumers shop at the lower-priced firm. Define a Nash equilibrium in prices p; and ps. Solve for the equilibrium and explain your work. (20 pts) 3. Consider the following twoplayer simultaneous-move game. Player A chooses either 'up' (u) or 'down' (d). Player B chooses between 'left' (!) and 'right' (r). The table provided below gives the payoffs to player A and B given any set of choices, where player A's payoff is the first number. There are payoffs provided for three versions of this simple game. For each of the three games express the payoff information in the normal form as presented in class. Determine all of the pure strategy Nash equilibria for each of the three games. Explain your work. Identify any plauyer in any game who has a dominant strategy. (20 pts) Game 1l Game 2 Game 3 4,1 1,2 3,2 3,0 51 4,0 2,0 0,3 A8