1.1 External Perspectives on the Organizational Structure of U.S. Financial Regulation. To what extent should we pay attention to external recommendations such as those by the IMF and the FSB? Do such recommendations carry greater or lesser weight due to their foreign origin?

1.2 Do Post-Financial Crisis Reforms in the United States Align with Gadinis's Diagnosis? What should we make of the trend towards political involvement in financial regulation? Is this trend prevalent only in certain areas of financial regulation? As a matter of policy, is it desirable to inject political involvement in certain areas rather than others? What factors might help us determine which areas are appropriate for such involvement?

1.3 Cambridge Savings Bank's ROE in 2007 was 4.05% (that is, $7.3 million divided by $180.4 million). By comparison, FDIC data indicates that the average ROE for a savings bank in the fourth quarter of 2007 was 7.72%, while the average ROE for commercial banks was 12.18%. Notice that this average ROE for commercial banks was fairly close to GM's ROE in 2013 (12.5%), even though average ROA for commercial banks was at 1.20% was much lower than GM's 3.21%. How would you explain that result?

1.4 Different Charters in Bank Partners:It is common for an Internet marketplace lender to have partnerships with more than one bank. Utah ILCs are a common choice in combination with either a national bank or a state-chartered bank from another state. Why would Internet lenders choose to enter into a partnership with banks that have different chartering authorities?

1.5 Competition in Banking Markets. In a world of bank runs and crises, is there renewed validity in the older concerns about limiting competition in commercial banking? Is that possible in the era of nationwide Internet banking, the many