11EE microecon the question is complete

4. Describe the dynamic game using the normal form (pay-off matrix) representation and find the Nash equilibria of the game. Does the game have any Nash equilibria that are not subgame perfect? 3 Assume that incumbent is monopolist in 10 different national markets and it faces the threat of entry in all the markets sequentially (i.e., in stage 1 of the game the monopolist plays the game with a potential entrant in the Belgian market; in stage two the same game is played with another potential entrant for the Dutch market, and so on up to 10 rounds). 5. Find the SPNE of the entire dynamic game by backward induction. 6. Is there room for building a reputation? Explain your answer.

Consider the market for health insurance. Suppose that the market is comprised of 4 groups of people of differing risk categories. There are a large and equal number of people in each group, but insurers cannot tell which group a person belongs to (i.e. this is a situation of asymmetric information). Each group faces a risk of requiring medical treatment of value $10,000. Suppose that the willingness to pay of people in each group is as follows: Risk 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 willingness to pay 2,500 5,200 6,800 8,500 Actuarially fair premium Risk Premium a. Complete the table of actuarially fair insurance premiums that could be charged to each group separately by an insurance company large enough to diversify the risks. How do these compare to the willingness to pay? b. Suppose now that the risk category is private information. What is the average riskiness of a person seeking insurance? What premium would an insurance company have to charge to break even? c. Will all the agents participate at this price? If not what would be the composition of risks facing the insurer? Would the premium found above be sufficient to cover the risks taken by the insurer? d. Continue with this logic. What will be the price of insurance in the equilibrium and which groups will participate? e. Is this an efficient outcome?

A real or simulated workplace environment Workplace equipment (how to use the equipment must be explained, if unfamiliar to the learner) Workplace policies and procedures.

1. As a real or simulated workplace activity as directed by the assessor, you must handle and respond to a customer enquiry or complaint which has been sent via an electronic communication medium.

You must follow organisational policies and procedures to take appropriate action to assess and resolve this; this will include following the designated timeline for response. This will be relevant to your area of work and job role (or intended job role).

You will need to read this enquiry or complaint, and interpret the customer's message. The appropriate action must then be identified and taken. You may need to speak with your superior, or the person acting as your superior, to do this, for example, to ask a question or to seek authority for a remedy. However, self-management skills will be required to ensure that the enquiry or complaint is dealt with and responded to as necessary. You must communicate your response to the customer in a professional manner.

13. Post-Investment Hold Up (3 points)

a) Your firm received an RFP (request for proposal) on a wire harness from GM with avoidable fixed costs of $1 million and MC of $1 with expected sales of 1 million units to GM. What's the minimum price that you would be willing to sell each wire harness to GM (i.e. what's the break-even price)? (1 point)

b) GM agrees to the price in part a), and then hands you with a PO (purchase order) for 0.5 million units. What do you say to them? (1 point)

c) Describe how this situation could result in post-investment hold up and then propose one way to reduce the risk of hold up for your firm? (1 point)

Given the following equations:

yt = yn + it - ite

where y is output, and i is inflation and ie is expected inflation and t is time.

The Central Bank loss function is given by:

L =[ b/2 * (yt - k)2 ]+ 1/2 (it)2

Derive the Central Bank's preferred inflation rate.

Derive the socially optimal inflation.