1.)Consider the two-round bargaining game. The minimum the seller will sell his home for 188,000 and the maximum the buyer is willing to pay is $200,000. Both players know these two amounts and are bargaining over the difference (M=$12,00). Assume the disagreement values are zero for both players. Player 1 moves first by making a proposal and Player 2 can accept and reject. If player 2 rejects Player's 1 proposal, then Player 2 gets to make a proposal, which Player 1 can reject and accept. The game is then over. Suppose the both players discount the future income at the rate d=0.2 per period. That is, $0.20 now is equivalent to $1,00 received next round. Find the equilibrium for this 2-round game. What is the sale price of the home?Which player gets the larger share of M?