1.q6. Now consider a modified setting. There is one producer of wine (Firm M) but two retailers in the market (Firms R1, R2). The ducer makes wine at a cost of $20 per bottle, and sells each bottle to the retailers for Pm . The retailers then resell the wine to sumers. The retailers have no cost other than the price pm paid to the producer. ume that the order of events is as follows: The producer sets Pm; then, having observed Pm, the retailers compete a la Bertrand . That irms R1 and R2 simultaneously set prices p1 and p2, respectively. The consumers' demand for bottles of wine is given by 140 - minp1, p2, where qis the total number of wine bottles sold by the retailers. The consumers only buy from the retailer that sets lowest price. If both retailers set the same price, they split the demand equally. What is the equilibrium price pm set by the producer in the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this game? a. 60 b. 80 C. 20 d. 40 e. 110