2. Assume that three individuals participate in a second price sealed-bid auction for an object. Their privately known values are vi = 100 for individual1, v2 = 70 for individual 2, and v3 = 30 for individual 3. They secretly submit their respective bids by, by and by, and these bids are placed in an envelope that is then sealed. The next day, the auctioneer opens the envelope, inspects the bids, and sells the object to the bidder who has submitted the highest bid, but requires the highest bidder to pay only the second highest bid that has been submitted. (a) What is the rational bid that individuals 1, 2, and 3 should submit? Explain. (b) If each bidder could see the bid that the other two rational bidders had submitted, would any of them have any incentive to submit a different bid? Explain. (c) Why is the second price sealed bid auction equivalent to an ascending bid English auction (where the successive bids are observed by all of the participants in the auction)? Explain