2. Consider now the following prisoners' dilemma game and answer the previous question using this game. Hints: (a) Tit-For-Tat: The behavior of a player who adopts this strategy depends only on the last period's outcome. Therefore, we can group all the histories into those with the last period's outcome being (C,C),(C,D),(D,C), or (D,D). We have to test optimality of the strategy after all such histories using the one-shot-deviation property. We will check optimality from the perspective of player 1 , which is without any loss of generality since the game is symmetric. (b) Pavlov: There are three type of histories: (i) Those that end with (C,C); (ii) Those that end with (D,D); (iii) All other histories. 2. Consider now the following prisoners' dilemma game and answer the previous question using this game. Hints: (a) Tit-For-Tat: The behavior of a player who adopts this strategy depends only on the last period's outcome. Therefore, we can group all the histories into those with the last period's outcome being (C,C),(C,D),(D,C), or (D,D). We have to test optimality of the strategy after all such histories using the one-shot-deviation property. We will check optimality from the perspective of player 1 , which is without any loss of generality since the game is symmetric. (b) Pavlov: There are three type of histories: (i) Those that end with (C,C); (ii) Those that end with (D,D); (iii) All other histories