2. Oligopoly Assume we have a market with two identical firms, firm 1 and firm 2, that produce the same product. Both firms face the same demand curve p = 180 - 291 - 2q2 and have the same constant marginal costs of MC = 60. a) Let's assume these firms organize into a cartel. What are the equilibrium quantities, price, and profits that each firm receives? b) Now, suppose the firms competed in prices (Bertrand Competition), what are the equi- librium quantities, price, and profits that each firm receives? c) Now, let's assume the firms competed in quantities (Cournot Competition) instead. What are the equilibrium quantities, price, and profits that each firm receives? d) Finally, let's suppose that firm 1 is the industry leader and firm 2 is the follower. If firm 1 chooses their quantity first, and firm 2 is able to observe firm 1's quantity before choosing their own (Stackelberg Competition), what are the equilibrium quantities, price, and profits that each firm receives