2. Recently at the English Bakery in question 1 there have been significant problems in recognizing individual effort, so John now decides that he will pay the individuals on the basis of team output rather than individual output. Each agent's reward schedule is now a + Q/3 instead of a + Qi (Q= Q1 + Q+ Q3). Now answer the following questions (assume everything else is the same as in question 1). a) What is now the (privately) optimal amount of effort for agent 1? How many pies does she make (this does not have to be an integer)? b) Assuming once again that the compensation scheme is designed to give each agent a level of utility equal to her next-best alternative(10), what must be the value of the fixed portion of her income (a)? What is her total income, and what is the profit for the firm that results from agent 1's efforts? Are your answers the same for agents 2 and 3? c) Find the firm's total profit from all three workers combined. d) Did your answers in parts (a) - (c) change from question 1? Why? What are some of the problems associated with teams? e) Devise a reward schedule based on team output only, that increases the sum of profits and utility above the level in parts (a) through (c)