2) Shareholder Debtholder Problem: Assume that a firm is worth $1,000. Debtholders hold claims to the first $900, and equity has claim to the remainder. Equity holders have an opportunity to invest in a project that costs $500 today, and with 40% probability, the project will be worth $1,000 tomorrow. With 60% probability, the project will be worthless tomorrow. Again, for simplicity, assume that there is no time value of money here. Also, for simplicity, assume that if the value of the project equals zero, then the project will not be undertaken. a) What is the NPV of this project, and should it be accepted or rejected based on the NPV? -$100, accept -$100, reject $140, accept $140, reject b) What is the value of this project to shareholders, and would they rationally accept or reject? -$100, accept -$ 100, reject $140, accept $140, reject c) Assume that the debtholders had negotiated a covenant based on a leverage ratio (here, Debt I Equity ratio) in the initial contract. Typically, the covenant would dictate the maximum amount of leverage that a company can assume. Ifthe company's leverage ratio exceeds this mandate, then the company is in technical default [which is not good!). What is the maximum D/E ratio that would have aligned shareholder and debtholder incentives for this project? 3.50 2.75 2.50 2.00