2. Tax collection is complicated by the existence of tax fraud. Fraud can be detected by experienced tax officer but unfortunately it is costly to hire those officers. Consider then the following model of tax fraud. There are two players: (tax) officer and (tax) payer. The officer decides whether to monitor the filings of the tax payer at a cost or not monitor. The tax payer files either honestly or fraudulently. Honest filings are always accepted but fraudulent filings are caught if the officer chooses to monitor. With an undetected fraudulent filing, the tax payer pays little taxes. With an honest filing, she pays a moderate amount. If she files fraudulently and is caught, then she pays a very large fine on top of honest taxes. The tax officer pays nothin and receives no payments if she does not monitor. She pays the cost of monitoring if she monitors and from the fraudulent taxes she also collects the fine. (a) Draw a game matrix for this situation. Assume first that the payoffs are simply the monetary payoffs to the players. (b) Does this game have dominant strategies? What about Nash equilibria? (c) How does the game change if you allow for the possibility that tax payers may feel guilty about committing tax fraud