2. The game below depicts revenues to the New York Knicks & The Brooklyn Nets based on the number of games they decide to broadcast locally. Assume they serve the same metropolitan area (market), and that each team pursues a strategy of best response. KNICKS 40 games 30 games NETS 40 $ 10 85 games $ 10 mil $ 20 mil. mil . MIL. 30 $ 20 $15 games $5 Mil. mil mil. i. The Knicks a dominant strategy in this game; the Nets a dominant strategy in this game. a. Do have ; do have b . Do not have ; do have C. P Do have ; do not have Do not have ; do not have ii. The Nash equilibrium in this game is for the Knicks to broadcast games and for the Nets to broadcast games. a. 30 ; 30 30 ; 40 40 ; 30 40 ; 40ill. Were the two teams able to collude and reach an enforceable agreement, they would each broadcast games and would be better off than at the Nash equilibrium in (ii) above. a. 30 ; each team b. 30 ; only the Nets C. 30 ; only the Knicks d. 40 ; neither team iv. The stability of any agreement these two teams might reach gets stronger if a. The game is played repeatedly. b. Either team can successfully punish cheaters. C. Both (a) and (b) are true. d. Neither (a) nor (b) is true