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21. Theinversemarketdemandisgivenbyp(y)=26y. Supposethereareonlytwofirmsand bothofthemhavethecostfunctionci(yi)=2yi.Thefirmsareplayingtheinfinitelyrepeated 7Cournotgame.ForGrimTriggerStaregytobeaSubgamePerfectNashEquilibriumofthis game, thediscountfactormustbegreaterthan (Roundtotheclosestnumber) (a) 0.50 (b) 0.53. (c) 0.57. (d) 0.6. The answer is B

21. Theinversemarketdemandisgivenbyp(y)=26y. Supposethereareonlytwofirmsand bothofthemhavethecostfunctionci(yi)=2yi.Thefirmsareplayingtheinfinitelyrepeated 7Cournotgame.ForGrimTriggerStaregytobeaSubgamePerfectNashEquilibriumofthis game, thediscountfactormustbegreaterthan (Roundtotheclosestnumber) (a) 0.50 (b) 0.53. (c) 0.57. (d) 0.6. The answer is B

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