There are two types of mobile phone case manufacturers. "High-quality" manufacturers produce very good cases that consumers value at $20. "Low-quality" manufacturers produce less good ones that are valued at $14. Customers can order a mobile phone case online from a manufacturer. At the time of purchase, customers cannot distinguish between a high-quality manufacturer or a low-quality manufacturer. However, they can determine the quality of the product after purchase. High quality manufacturers can manufacture the product at a constant unit cost of $ch. Low quality manufacturers can manufacture the product at a constant unit cost of $10. Consumers can be assumed to have similar risk neutral preferences. (a) For a lottery L, how does i) the risk premium and ii) the certainty equivalent of the lottery differ for risk averse, risk loving and risk neutral consumers? (6 marks) (b) State a possible utility function for the consumers, u(x), defined on monetary value x. Given this utility function, what is their expected utility of getting a high-quality case with probability p and getting a low-quality case with probability 1 - p? (6 marks) (c) Suppose that the proportion of high-quality manufacturers is. What will be the equilibrium outcome(s)-i.e. who is in the market and what are prices - in the following 2 cases: i) CH = $12 and ii) CH = $17? (10 marks) (d) Suppose the proportion of high-quality manufacturers is 1/2. For what values of cH is there an equilibrium in which both types of phone manufacturers are in the market? (6 marks)