( 22 points) There are two (and only two) firms in the market for carrots: Grimhouse ("G") and Boltway ( "B"). Due to superior farmland and technology, G has a cost advantage over B. Specifically, CG(qG)=100+2qG and CB(qB)=140+7qB. The market demand curve is given by Q=1202P, where Q=qG+qB and P is the price of carrots. (a) Find the Cournot Equilibrium price, as well as the quantities and profits for each firm, and the consumer surplus. (b) Calculate the HHI for this market. (c) Is the HHI in this market higher or lower than the HHI of a duopoly in which the firms have equal market share? (d) Suppose instead that both firms have C(q)=120+4.5q. How would this change the Cournot equilibrium: i. price? ii. consumer surplus? iii. individual firm profits? iv. industry profits? Explain how these changes fit together. ( 22 points) There are two (and only two) firms in the market for carrots: Grimhouse ("G") and Boltway ( "B"). Due to superior farmland and technology, G has a cost advantage over B. Specifically, CG(qG)=100+2qG and CB(qB)=140+7qB. The market demand curve is given by Q=1202P, where Q=qG+qB and P is the price of carrots. (a) Find the Cournot Equilibrium price, as well as the quantities and profits for each firm, and the consumer surplus. (b) Calculate the HHI for this market. (c) Is the HHI in this market higher or lower than the HHI of a duopoly in which the firms have equal market share? (d) Suppose instead that both firms have C(q)=120+4.5q. How would this change the Cournot equilibrium: i. price? ii. consumer surplus? iii. individual firm profits? iv. industry profits? Explain how these changes fit together