3. (10 pts.) Consider the following game between Pepci and Kola (BAU=business as usual). Kola Advertise BAU Challenge (2, 2) (5,5) Pepci Coexist (0,5) (1, 10) a) Find all pure strategy nash equilibria (explain why the outcomes are nash equilibria). (2 pts.) b) Find all mixed strategy nash equilibria that are not pure strategy nash equilibria (show all steps and reasoning). (2 pts.) c) Suppose that the game is repeated once every year, forever. Player i's payoff of the repeated game is a discounted sum of period specific payoffs. Suppose that the discount rate B = 0.8. Can grim-trigger strategies constitute a nash equilibrium of the repeated game? (4 pts.) d) Continuing from part c), Is there the lowest value of B that can support a grim-trigger strategy equilibrium? If so, what is it, and if not, why not? (2 pts.) 3. (10 pts.) Consider the following game between Pepci and Kola (BAU=business as usual). Kola Advertise BAU Challenge (2, 2) (5,5) Pepci Coexist (0,5) (1, 10) a) Find all pure strategy nash equilibria (explain why the outcomes are nash equilibria). (2 pts.) b) Find all mixed strategy nash equilibria that are not pure strategy nash equilibria (show all steps and reasoning). (2 pts.) c) Suppose that the game is repeated once every year, forever. Player i's payoff of the repeated game is a discounted sum of period specific payoffs. Suppose that the discount rate B = 0.8. Can grim-trigger strategies constitute a nash equilibrium of the repeated game? (4 pts.) d) Continuing from part c), Is there the lowest value of B that can support a grim-trigger strategy equilibrium? If so, what is it, and if not, why not? (2 pts.)