3. Consider a monopolist selling candy to two consumers (assume candy is innitely divis ible, so that the monopolist can sell any nonnegative, real quantity). The demand function of consumer I is p1(q1) = 9 3q1. Consumer 2's demand function is 332032) 2 8 592. All quantities are expressed in pounds (weight) and prices in pounds (currency). The monopolist can produce candy at no cost. (a) Suppose the monopolist can distinguish between the two consumers and is also able to offer them xedquantity packages, so that they cannot continuously choose any amount they want. What packages will the monopolist offer to the two consumers (state quantities and fees)? What prot will the monopolist earn? (b) 5 marksl Suppose the monopolist can still distinguish between the two consumers, but now, because of regulation, it must supply any amount of candy that the consumers choose (i.e., it cannot restrict consumers3 choice to a menu of xed packages). Thus, the monopolist will charge each consumer a different constant price per pound of candy. Furthermore, the monopolist is not allowed to charge consumers any xed fees. What price will the monopolist set for each consumer? What quantities will be consumed, and what will be the monopolist's prot? (c) Now suppose that the monopolist cannot distinguish anymore between the two consumers, but is allowed to offer xed packages. How can the monopolist achieve the highest prot (state quantities and fees for each package)? What is the monopolist's prot? (d) Suppose consumer 2's mum tells her to cut down on her candy consump- tion. As a result, this consumer's demand function collapses to p2(q2) : 4 5q2. The monopolist still cannot distinguish the consumers, but can offer xed packages. What are the optimal packages now