3. Consider a repeated prisoner's dilemma, played by the same two players (who we will call Player A and Player B) for five periods. In each period, each player decides whether to play C (cooperate) or D (defect). We will consider several strategies discussed in class: e Always Defect: choose D in every period e Grim Trigger: choose C' until your opponent chooses D, then choose D forever e Suspicious Tit for Tat: choose D first, then choose your opponent's last action (a) Suppose players A and B both play grim trigger. What actions will be chosen in the five periods? (b) Suppose player A plays grim trigger while player B plays always defect. What actions will be chosen in the five periods? () Suppose player A plays suspicious tit for tat while player B plays grim trigger. What actions will be chosen in the five periods? (d) Suppose (as in lecture) that payoffs are: Which of the three scenarios (a)-(c) gives the highest average payoff for each player across the five periods