3. Consider a variant of the independent private values sealed-bid auc- tions considered in class in which the players are risk-averse. Specif- ically, assume that the payoff of a player with valuation '0 who wins the object and pays the price p is (v pol/"1, where m > 1. (In class we considered the case m = 1, in which the bidders are \"risk neutral". For m > 1, the bidders are \"risk averse\") (a) Find an equilibrium of the second-price auction. (b) Suppose that there are two players and each player's valuation is drawn independently from a uniform distribution on [0, 1] (as we assumed in class). Find an equilibrium of the rst-price auction. (Hint: Assume that when player 2's valuation is 02 she bids [302, where ,6 is a constant. Find the best response of player 1 to this strategy of player 2 when player 1's valuation is 01.)