3. Suppose Betsy, Daniel, and Michael are planning on attending an English auction. They realise that they are planning on bidding on the same item, for which each of their valuations are vs=l{}. vn=5ll and vsr=25 {each does not know the others' valuation}. As such, they agree to form a ring in which the knockout auction will be held under the same rules as the actual auction. If the actual auction is an English auction: What is the expected price in the knockout auction? The auctioneer's reservation price has bem annouuoed to be ll]. Give me an example of the ring's bidding strategy {bn,bn,bsr} that will maximize their prots. Member that a strategy in an English auction is the amount the player is willing to be up to. If the ring is completely successrl, what is each player's payoff\"? Is the strategy you specied in [b]: a Nash equilibrium? Prove it. Does your answer to {c} change if the knockout and actual auctions are Dutch auctions? Why or why not