4. (15 Points) Now let us assume there are two pharmaceutical companies who both own the rights to manufacture a drug (and ignore any R&D costs). Both firms face the same market demand P(@) = 130 - 5@ as in Question 3, where @ is the demand for the drug. Assume each company has the same marginal cost of 30. (a) (7 Points) In a model of Stackelberg competition, where firm A produces first and then firm B enters the market and produces, how much would each firm produce? Also compute the equilibrium price and profits of each firm. Would firms prefer to produce first or produce second? (b) (3 points) Under Bertrand competition, where firms compete over price, what is the equilibrium price and how much would each firm produce and what are profits of each firm? (c) (5 points) If these firms are competing over price, but now there are some differ- ences in the two companies' drugs (e.g., one is given through a shot and one is administered through the nose, and some people prefer one approach to another), how would this generally affect the prices and profits of each firm? If one firm commits to a price, and then the other, would firms prefer to commit to a price first or second? Would firms prefer to commit to a price first or choose prices at the same time