4. Consider a second price auction model with twelve participants. However, unlike what we have seen so when we analyzed dominant strategies, the valuations of the 12 par- ticipants are common knowledge amongst the bidders. The auctioneer does not know those values. Consider now the valuation profile of the twelve participants: valuation profile: (100, 95, 90, 85, 80, 75, 70, 65, 60, 55, 50, 45) Also let the following be the bid profile: bid profile: (95, 94, 91, 85, 81, 74, 100, 75, 65, 55, 50, 200) Verify whether the bid profile is a Nash Equilibrium or not? Also, Identify a Nash equilibrium for 12 participants with the above valuations in which the participant with valuation 45 wins the auction