4.) Suppose there are two rms in a market who each simultaneously choose a quantity. Firm 1 '5 quantity is q,, and rm 2's quantity is qz. Therefore, the market quantity is Q = q1 + q;. The market de- mand curve is given by P = 500 -30. Also, each rm has constant marginal cost equal to 50. There are no xed costs. The marginal Revenue of the two rms are given by: MR1 = 500 - 6Q1-3q; MR2 = 500 5Q2'3Q1 A. How much output will each firm produce in the Cournot equilibrium? B. What will be the market price of the good? C. How much prot does each rm make? D. What would be the market price if the market were perfectly competitive? E. How much output would be produced if the market where perfectly competitive? F. What is the deadweight loss that results from this duopoly? G. What wOuId be the quantity of the good produced if the rms merged into a monopoly? H. What would be the market price if the two rms merged into a monopoly? I. How much additional deadweight would the monopoly create compared to the duopoly