5. (10 points) The following provides information for a one-shot game. Firm B Firm A (2,2) (10,8) High Price (8, 10) (15, 15) The rst number in brackets is Firm A's return, and the second number in brackets is Firm B's return. Firm A and Firm B operate in a duopoly in which you and a rival must simultaneously decide what price to advertise in the weekly newspaper. (a) Does Firm A have a dominant strategy? If yes, what is that dominant strategy? (b) Does Firm B have a dominant strategy? If yes, what is that dominant strategy? (c) Is there a Nash equilibrium (or Nash equilibriums) for the above game? If yes, what is that Nash equilibrium? ((1) What will the collusive outcome be for the above game? (e) If a collusive outcome is reached, will either rm have an incentive to cheat on the agreement? Please explain