5. Consider the following three-player game: Entrant Stay out (0,2,2) Incumbent 1 Incumbent 2 Entrant Entrant (1,2,1) (-5,-5,2) (0,5,2) (5,0,2) (1,1,2) A potential entrant is considering whether to enter into market 1 (play ), or market 2 (play E) or to stay out of both markets. The Entrant moves first. If it enters market 1, it will play a simultaneous-move game with the incumbent firm in that market called Incumbent 1. In this subgame, the Entrant and Incumbent 1 simultaneously decide whether to play Fight () or Accommodate (A). Alternatively, the Entrant can enter into market 2 (or play E5) where the incumbent in that market (Incumbent 2) has a first-mover advantage. Incumbent 2 can play either Fight (F') or Accommodate (A). The Entrant also has the option to stay out of either market. The payoffs in the game are denoted (z, y, z), where the first entry is the payoff to the entrant, the second is the payoff to Incumbent 1, and the third is the payoff to Incumbent 2. (a) How many subgames are there in this game? (2 marks) (b) Represent this game in normal form (table form). (4 marks) (c) ldentify all pure-strategy Nash equilibria of the game. (8 marks) (d) Which of the pure-strategy Nash equilibria that you identified in the previous subquestion are subgame perfect? (8 marks)