5. Consider the strategic-form game represented by the following matrix: Player 2 L R T (6,6) (2,8) B (8,2) (0,0) Player 1 chooses between T and B and receives the payoff in the bottom-left corner of the cells. Player 2 chooses between L and R and receives the payoff in the top-right corner of the cells. Choices are made simultaneously. (20 point) (a) What are the Nash equilibria (including any mixed) of this game, and what are the players' expected payoffs in each equilibrium? (b) Suppose a single (fair) coin is tossed, the outcome of which is publicly observed. If it is heads player 1 is told to play T, and player 2 is told to play R; if it is tails, player 1 is told to play B, and player 2 is told to play L. Would each player be willing to follow these instructions, given that the other player did so? What would be the expected payoffs? Comment