5. Lewis & Clark has announced that it will license two firms to serve food to students on campus. Campus demand for food is P = 100 Q. Assume food production on campus, once a fixed investment of $F is made, has zero marginal cost. However, once Fo is invested firms are unable to change their chosen level of output. If L&C sells a license that allows a firm to move first (i.e., choose their Q first), and another that allows the other firm to chose second, how much will each license sell for? How much could L&C sell a license to a single monopoly supplier of food? 5. Lewis & Clark has announced that it will license two firms to serve food to students on campus. Campus demand for food is P = 100 Q. Assume food production on campus, once a fixed investment of $F is made, has zero marginal cost. However, once Fo is invested firms are unable to change their chosen level of output. If L&C sells a license that allows a firm to move first (i.e., choose their Q first), and another that allows the other firm to chose second, how much will each license sell for? How much could L&C sell a license to a single monopoly supplier of food